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Despite being one of Europe’s most significant destinations for migration, Germany has long 
wrestled with the notion that it may or may not be a ‘country of immigration’. Approaching 
this question from a positive rather than a normative perspective, this article explores how 
Germany is changing in this respect, by examining changes over the past two decades in 
terms of migration flows, the policy framework and the degree of societal and institutional 
adaptation to migration. It argues that Germany has become much more diverse and also 
notes the major policy developments that have taken place after the change of government in 
1998. While the dominant theme of migration policy has moved on from prevention to 
integration, Germany’s impending demographic transformation poses a major new challenge, 
which will require governments to look once again to more active recruitment of labour 
migration.  
 
Introduction: Germany as a ‘Country of Immigration’ 
 
One of the most significant meta-trends of post-1945 Europe has been the way in which 
immigration has progressively changed nation-states across the continent.1 Northwestern 
European countries such as the UK, Netherlands, Belgium and France were among the first to 
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experience this in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by Mediterranean countries such as Spain 
and Italy after 1990; more recently, the accession of ten central and east European countries to 
the European Union (EU) in 2004/7 has in turn led to countries such as Poland, Hungary and 
Slovakia experiencing much greater levels of immigration. This gradual transformation over 
time is all the more significant for the fact that most countries in Europe have histories as 
countries of emigration, not immigration. 
 
Yet of all the countries of immigration in Europe, it is in Germany that the transformation has 
been most striking. From a country which was a principal source of emigration to the United 
States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,2 Germany has since 1945 experienced 
immigration on a large scale, over time and of considerable diversity. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, some 12 million refugees arrived from Germany’s 
former eastern territories. After 1950, over 4 million ethnic Germans, primarily from Poland, 
Romania and the countries of the former Soviet Union immigrated to (West) Germany. From 
1955 onwards, non-ethnic German migration began with, first, the recruitment of labour 
migrants (guestworkers - Gastarbeiter) until 1973, when this was suspended by the SPD-FDP 
government under Willy Brandt (the so-called Anwerbestopp).3 After 1973, a large rump of 
these (formerly temporary, now increasingly permanent) migrants remained in the country, 
which in turn prompted new influxes in the form of dependant migration. After 1979, asylum 
too emerged as a new and significant source of immigration, with almost 2.6 million 
applications lodged in Germany in the following twenty years. 
 
All told, Germany after 1945 has become one of the most significant destinations for 
immigration in the developed world. Yet over decades and infamously, (West) Germany 
conducted a long and anguished debate over whether it could or should be considered a 
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‘country of immigration’. Indeed, until the late 1990s, the notion that it was not (Deutschland 
ist kein Einwanderungsland) underpinned official government policy of preventing new 
permanent immigration. It only fell out of use after 1998, when the CDU/CSU-FDP federal 
government under Helmut Kohl gave way to an SPD-Green coalition under Gerhard 
Schröder, which then proceeded to prioritise integration alongside prevention as a policy goal. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the notion of Germany as a country of immigration has featured 
prominently in the academic literature in this area.4  
 
Back in the 1970s and 1980s, and when taken on its own terms, this policy even made a 
certain amount of sense. For the CDU/CSU, the rejection (as opposed to denial) of Germany 
as an immigration country was based on the (factually correct) assertion that immigrants were 
not being actively sought in order to increase the country’s population in the way that, for 
instance, was the case in the United States or Australia during the first half of the twentieth 
century. Even when large-scale labour immigration did take place, especially during the 
1960s, it was never considered anything more than a temporary, stop-gap solution to labour 
shortages - as indeed the term ‘guestworkers’ implied. Furthermore, as Christian Joppke and 
Rogers Brubaker rightly note, the notion that (West) Germany was not a ‘country of 
immigration’ has to be understood as a normative goal, reflecting the fact that immigration 
played no part in the process of building the German nation-state. This notion moreover has to 
be seen in the context that no western European country at that time would have claimed 
otherwise.5  
 
All the same, the political debate over whether or not this moniker was accurate bore little 
resemblance to the reality of migration in (West) Germany.6 As Figure 1 shows, by the time 
of unification in 1990, West Germany had around 4.5 million non-national residents (i.e. 
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excluding ethnic Germans), principally from Turkey, former Yugoslavia and Italy, 
representing over 7.5 per cent of the total population. In major cities such as Frankfurt, 
Munich, Stuttgart and Cologne, non-nationals accounted for upwards of 20 per cent of the 
population.  
 
- Figure 1 about here -  
 
Figure 1 also shows that unification in 1990 led to a further sharp increase in the number of 
non-nationals.7 By 2010, their number stood at 6.7 million, including 1.6 million Turkish 
citizens.8 Germany therefore has the largest foreign population in absolute terms in Europe, 
and one of the highest in relative terms too. It is also increasingly diverse: whereas, during the 
1980s, the non-national population was dominated by the eight countries with which 
Germany had signed recruitment treaties in the 1950s and 1960s, there were 30 nationalities 
with more than 50,000 citizens residing in Germany in 2010. Perhaps more importantly, with 
over 4.3 million resident Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in 2010, accounting for around 
one-fifth of the total number resident in the EU, Germany also has by far the highest number 
of nationals who are most affected by immigration regulations in the EU. In short, and from a 
positive as opposed to normative perspective, there can be little residual doubt that 
contemporary Germany is, in fact, a country of immigration.  
 
Even so, the idea that Germany now may be considered a ‘country of immigration’ cannot be 
a static one, as both the sources and level of immigration to Germany, as well as the political 
and social responses to it, are subject to constant change. What is more, new endogenous 
pressures have emerged over time. In recent years, large-scale and persistent skills shortages 
have become apparent in the German economy.9 In parallel, and in common with many other 
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western European countries, Germany’s Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of around 1.4 has been far 
below the necessary replacement level of 2.2 for around four decades now. When combined 
with steady increases in life expectancy to currently around 80 at birth, Germany is facing a 
major change in the demographic composition of its population. Indeed, in 2009, the Federal 
Statistical Office projected Germany’s population to fall rapidly after 2020 to about 65 
million by 2060, a third of which will moreover be aged 65 or more.10 This reality profoundly 
alters the context within which Germany formulates its approach to immigration: whereas 
prevention could be the dominant maxim before 1998 and integration thereafter, the need to 
shift towards the active recruitment of especially high-skilled migration has become clear and 
pressing, as acknowledged by the Federal Government in its recent 2012 demographic 
strategy.11 
 
The change in perspective brought about by demographic transformation provides a useful 
opportunity to take stock of Germany’s situation as a country of immigration. In order to do 
so, the article adopts a birds-eye perspective of migration and migration policy over the past 
two decades. What trends can be identified in migration over this time? How has Germany’s 
policy framework, whose paucity had been the subject of extensive criticism during the 1980s 
and 1990s, fared? And how well has Germany institutionally and culturally adapted towards 
migration? The central argument of this article is that, over this period, a much more complex, 
multi-dimensional and differentiated picture of migration has emerged in Germany, which 
broadly speaking reflects its growing maturity as a country of immigration. As part of this, the 
article shows that there has been a process of ‘catch-up’ in terms its policy framework, as a 
result of which Germany is now broadly in line with other European countries. But this 
picture of the changing nature of migration in Germany will also provide indications as to 
whether Germany is prepared for the challenges that lie ahead in this area.  
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Migration Flows to Germany 
 
The starting point of the empirical discussion, then, is to examine the level and composition 
of recent migration flows to Germany. These are illustrated for Germans and non-Germans 
between 1991 and 2010 in Figure 2.  
 
- Figure 2 about here -  
 
Figure 2 shows clearly the impact of the end of the Cold War on migration flows, which 
reached unprecedented levels, both by ethnic Germans and by asylum seekers, during the 
early 1990s. Since the turn of the Millennium, though, a number of other interesting trends 
can be picked out. First, the absolute level of immigration, despite dropping noticeably from 
its peak in 1992, when over 438,000 asylum applications were lodged in Germany, has 
remained high. Over this twenty-year period, the average level of immigration stands at 
900,000 persons per annum, of which almost 80 per cent are non-Germans.12 
 
But Figure 2 also shows that emigration has also been consistently high, averaging 686,000 
persons annually over this period. In recent years, the gap between immigration and 
emigration has narrowed to produce a clear downward trend in net migration to Germany: 
between 2004 and 2007, this fell below +100,000 persons per annum and in 2008 and 2009, 
there was even net emigration. This trend appears to be closely linked to the indifferent state 
of the German economy for most of the 2000s, including relatively high levels of 
unemployment. By the same token, the increase in net migration to +128,000 in 2010 reflects 
the recent economic boom the country has enjoyed, combined with the relative weakness of 
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other EU economies.13 In the long term, though, this trend of low net immigration has 
significant implications for Germany’s population development. For the 2009 projection that 
Germany’s population will fall to about 65 million in 2060 depends on an average net 
migration of +100,000 persons to Germany over this period.14 Yet from 2004-10, average net 
migration has been just +41,000 persons, which means that if the recent upturn cannot be 
sustained over time, then Germany’s population decline will actually be amplified. 
 
Third, migration trends within individual citizenships have become more diverse. Thus, 
whereas the vast majority of foreign citizenships displayed net immigration up until the mid-
1990s, the picture has become more nuanced since then. This is illustrated in Figure 3 for 
Turkish, Polish and also German citizens, three nationalities with high overall volumes of 
migration. For Polish nationals, the net migration pattern has remained positive throughout 
these 20 years (although in some years only just). This reflects the general migration pattern 
to Germany from the new eastern European member-states of the EU.  
 
- Figure 3 about here - 
 
By contrast, the substantial level of net immigration by German citizens in the early 1990s has 
been replaced by net emigration for this group after 2005, a trend which follows that of 
citizens of the ‘old’ EU-14 countries, who also experienced net emigration between 2002 and 
2009.15 In part, this can be put down to the sharp reduction in immigration by ethnic Germans 
and their dependants, who are formally German citizens: this fell from over 200,000 p.a. in 
the early 1990s to under 5,000 p.a. since 2008. In fact, once ethnic Germans are filtered out of 
these figures, the net emigration of German nationals stretches back to 1993.16 Here too, the 
relatively weak performance of the German economy over this period is likely to be a factor. 
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Interestingly, Figure 3 also reveals that a similar pattern of net emigration is emerging for 
Turkish citizens. Crucially, among both German and Turkish nationals, those leaving the 
country are often the highly-skilled who are seeking new opportunities abroad, thereby further 
exacerbating Germany’s skills shortages.17  
 
Overall and over the course of several decades, Germany has received a very large number of 
immigrants from a wide range of countries and for a wide range of reasons. These immigrants 
(where they are non-Germans) now have very long periods of residence in country. By 2010, 
the average residence period had risen to 18.9 years, a figure which has more than doubled 
since 1980. 39 per cent of all non-nationals in Germany in 2010 had at least 20 years’ 
residence, a figure which rose to 58 per cent and 68.6 per cent respectively for the two largest 
foreign nationalities, Turkey and Italy.18  
 
Germany’s non-national population is therefore large, well-settled and diverse. That said, the 
picture has become more complex and nuanced in recent years: the level of immigration has 
gradually been balanced by increasing emigration, which moreover affects certain 
nationalities, including Germans, more than others. While the resulting relatively low levels 
of net immigration will have a significant bearing upon the accuracy of population 
projections, it is arguably not appropriate to discard the label ‘country of immigration’, as 
Volker Ronge suggested just over a decade ago.19 Rather, the increasing diversity of 
migration to and from Germany and by different nationalities may rather be viewed as an 
indication of the extent to which Germany has matured as an immigration country.  
 
 
The Development of Germany’s Policy Framework 
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After migration flows, the second dimension of change to be considered here is the legal and 
policy framework to govern immigration and integration. This discussion is particularly 
germane to the notion of Germany as a changing ‘country of immigration’, as for decades, it 
was notorious for regulating such a central area of public policy through only a patchwork 
catalogue of individual laws and regulations, which were moreover managed separately by 
different ministries.  
 
However, since 2000, the rate of change in policy has been noticeably higher, to the extent 
that Germany has to a large extent ‘caught up’, both with other European countries and with 
itself. This can be illustrated by assessing changes in four key areas: labour migration, 
humanitarian migration, residence / integration and, lastly, citizenship. Post-unification 
changes in policy towards ethnic German immigration will also be considered briefly.  
 
First, as noted above, the dominant theme in labour migration since the Anwerbestopp of 1973 
has been prevention, reflecting the situation of the post-oil shock economic slowdown across 
Europe. As a result, an immigration law was considered superfluous, as CDU Interior 
Minister Manfred Kanther argued as late as 1995.20 Nor was this position unique to the 
CDU/CSU: in 1998, the response of the new SPD Interior Minister Otto Schily to the Greens’ 
argument for such legislation was that ‘there is no need for an immigration law because, if we 
had one, the quotas would be zero’.21 In fact, there was to be no legal avenue for new non-
European Economic Area (EEA) labour migration to Germany until 2000.22 By then, the 
structure and needs of the German economy had changed considerably, as skills and 
demographic shortages started to bite. The introduction of the so-called ‘Green Card’ 
programme that year, which granted temporary immigration rights to a limited number of 
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high-skilled migrants in the IT sector marked a first tentative shift away from this position. 
However, the fact that only two-thirds of the available permits were awarded severely limited 
the impact of the scheme.23 This ambivalence towards the risks and opportunities afforded by 
new labour migration was reflected in Germany’s decision to insist on the full seven-year 
transition period for the opening up of its labour market to the new EU member-states in 
2004. In particular, this decision was a concession to the unions by Chancellor Schröder, 
whose government was reeling from the controversy unleashed by the Agenda 2010 
programme and associated Hartz IV welfare reforms.24  
 
It was only with the 2005 Immigration Law that the general possibility of new (and high-
skilled) migration from outside the EEA was introduced, albeit under strict conditions, 
including a very high minimum salary; what is more, the government declined to consider a 
general points-based migration system of the kind employed by Australia or Canada. 
Subsequently, in 2009, the pre-requisites for this route (for instance in terms of starting 
salary) were eased, but the take-up of such opportunities remains indifferent. For instance, 
over the five-year period between 2006 and 2010, the average annual number of permits 
issued to ICT specialists, graduates and highly-skilled workers was just 2,995, 2,505 and 155 
respectively. In short, Germany has a poor record of attracting skilled migrants and it remains 
to be seen whether the introduction of EU-wide permits for labour migrants (the so-called 
‘Blue Card’) in 2009 can improve on what is a modest level. If not, it seems unlikely that 
significant long-term inroads can be made into either Germany’s demographic or skills 
shortages.  
 
Although the management of migration for humanitarian purposes, to comprise asylum and 
dependant migration, has fallen under different areas of legislation, the dominant theme here 
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too has been prevention.25 For twenty years between 1980 and 1999, (West) Germany was by 
far the largest destination for asylum seekers in the EU, a dynamic which peaked between 
1989 and 1993, when a total of over 1.3 million new applications were lodged. Following a 
cross-party compromise in late 1992 to restrict of the constitutional right to asylum after 
1993, including the introduction of the ‘safe third country’ and the ‘safe country of origin’ 
principles, numbers dropped sharply to between 20-30,000 applications per annum; 
meanwhile, other countries, notably the UK and France, have become more important 
destinations in their own right.  
 
However, what is noteworthy in this context is the narrow way in which asylum has been 
interpreted. For decades, and in contrast to other countries, Germany refused to recognise 
non-state agents of persecution (such as local militias), as well as gender-based persecution – 
issues which were only resolved in the 2005 Immigration Law. Consequently, initial 
recognition rates have long been very low in Germany and stood below 10 per cent in all but 
one year between 1997 and 2006.26 Since 2007, initial recognition rates have risen sharply, 
reflecting this new practice. At the same time, in around 20 to 30 per cent of cases, the 
application is rejected on ‘other’ grounds, including for procedural or formal reasons.27  
 
The domain of dependant migration has a similarly long history and today constitutes the 
principal form of non-EEA immigration to Germany.28 Yet it was only in 1981 that the 
Federal Government issued the first guidelines for dependant migration, and only in 1990 that 
this element was formalised in legislation in the revised Foreigners’ Law (Ausländergesetz) 
(see below). The issue of the immigration of dependant minors (Kindernachzug) has been 
particularly controversial, with the CDU/CSU long advocating an age limit of six for entry so 
that children would receive their full school education in Germany. The legislation ultimately 
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set the limit at sixteen years, but this is lower than in most EU countries, where eighteen years 
is typically the limit for dependants from non-EEA countries. Since 2007, Germany has also 
followed the lead of other European countries, notably the Netherlands, in introducing pre-
entry integration requirements for dependants.29 These have included language competence 
and self-sufficiency in terms of income, but controversially only apply to citizens of non-EU 
countries which are subject to visa entry requirements.30 
 
In the third area, residence, the legislative provision was particularly parsimonious. Until 
1965, the only legislation governing any immigration and residence by non-nationals (i.e. 
excluding ethnic Germans) was a police decree from 1938. Even when the first 
Ausländergesetz entered into effect in 1965, it was highly restrictive, in line with the notion 
that West Germany was not a country of immigration; for instance, the law made it virtually 
impossible for non-nationals to secure permanent residence.31 While this situation ended as a 
result of a landmark ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1978,32 it was only the 
revised Foreigners’ Law in 1990 which established clear rights to permanent residence status. 
But it took the 2005 Immigration Law to distil the bewildering catalogue of residence titles in 
the 1990 Law down from seven to two, thereby reflecting the ‘permanent / non-permanent’ 
dichotomy typical in other member-states of the EU. 
 
In integration too, a legislative and policy framework was virtually absent for decades.33 Until 
2005, the government’s formal position on integration was derived from the recommendations 
of a joint Federal Government – Länder Commission from 1977, which identified integration 
– perhaps a little incongruously - as a policy goal to operate alongside preventing new 
immigration and promoting repatriation.34 Moreover, the promotion of integration itself was 
overlaid with significant historically-based concerns about avoiding cultural assimilation, 
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which prevented a more assertive expression of expectations in this area.35 Once again, it fell 
to the 2005 Immigration Law to begin to rectify this deficit, by introducing formal integration 
courses for both non-nationals and ethnic Germans of the kind which are now common across 
Europe.36 This was followed up by new anti-discrimination legislation in 2006, as well as a 
law to ease the recognition of foreign professional qualifications in 2012.  
 
Since 2005, there has also been a much greater emphasis on creating a joined-up policy 
framework on integration at municipal, state (Land), federal and supranational levels and 
moreover to do so in dialogue with migrants themselves. Hitherto, the only input migrants had 
into policy was through (mainly municipal) consultative committees (Ausländerbeiräte). 
However, in 2006, the first-ever ‘Integration Summit’ (Integrationsgipfel) brought together 
federal-level migrant organisations and relevant ministries to generate a National Integration 
Plan the following year.37 2006 also saw the establishment of an annual dialogue with Islamic 
groups in Germany (Deutsche Islam Konferenz). While neither body has been without 
controversy, for instance in the selection of migrant groups to be represented and in their 
published outcomes, their very existence marks significant progress in achieving integrated 
policy responses.38 
 
The last area to be considered here, citizenship, is probably the most notorious for its failure 
to evolve. Until 2000, the legal basis for acquiring German citizenship remained the old, 
ethnically-focused Imperial Citizenship Law of 1913 (Reichs- und 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz). The law’s longevity was partially accidental and partially 
grounded in the exigencies of Germany’s post-Second World War situation: in 1949, the 
Western Allies needed to incorporate the 8 million refugees who had arrived in the new 
Federal Republic, while the new West German government sought to delegitimise East 
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Germany through an expansive definition of its citizenship. Both purposes were served 
admirably by the 1913 law.39  
 
At the same time, the limitation of access to German citizenship was a corollary of Germany’s 
status as a ‘non-immigration country’, as stipulated in the 1977 Guidelines on Naturalisation 
which put flesh on the bones of the otherwise rather opaque 1913 law.40 This included a 
reliance solely on the principle of descent in ascription (jus sanguinis), as well as long 
qualifying residence periods, high fees and a requirement for applicants to be released from 
their existing nationality in order to avoid the creation of dual citizenships. The result was 
that, on average, only 13,500 non-nationals annually became German citizens between 1972 
and 1989; furthermore, children born in Germany to non-national parents remained foreigners 
rather than becoming Germans automatically. This stood in stark contrast to ethnic Germans, 
who gained citizenship by virtue of their status alone. Although some modifications were 
introduced in 1990 and again in 1993,41 it was only in 2000 that a new citizenship law came 
into force. This not only greatly liberalised access to citizenship by naturalisation, but also 
introduced the territorial principle (jus soli) for the first time in German history.42 However, 
its quantitative impact has been lower than was initially expected, largely due to the new 
law’s maintenance in principle of Germany’s long-standing rejection of dual citizenships.43 
This is particularly evident in the so-called Optionspflicht, under which children who gained 
dual nationality via jus soli need to obtain release from their second citizenship by the age of 
23, or else face losing their German citizenship. Such cases will begin to arise in increasing 
numbers from 2013.44 
 
One final aspect of Germany’s policy framework must be mentioned briefly: the ending of 
privileged immigration rights for ethnic Germans and their dependants.45 The end of the Cold 
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War led to a significant influx of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler), first from Poland and Romania 
and later from the former Soviet Union, with almost 1 million arriving between 1990 and 
1992. In consequence, the 1992 cross-party asylum compromise included a change of status 
for this group: henceforth, only those born before 1993 could qualify for recognition as an 
ethnic German (now called Spätaussiedler) and a de-facto quota of 225,000 arrivals per 
annum imposed. After 1997, language tests were introduced as a precondition for recognition 
and until 2009, ethnic Germans arriving in Germany were not allowed to choose their place of 
residence freely. When combined with the sluggish economy during most of the past decade, 
such measures contributed to the sharp fall in numbers to almost negligible levels by 2010 
(see above).  
 
When these five dimensions are considered together, it is clear just how far Germany has 
travelled since unification in terms of its policy framework. In the late 1980s, the principal 
legislation, other than the constitutional provision for asylum and its subordinate legislation 
governing procedures,46 was the 1965 Foreigners’ Law and the 1913 Citizenship Law. After 
1990, a new Foreigners’ Law, combined with the ending of the preferential immigration 
rights for ethnic Germans and the constitutional reform of asylum started to bring the 
framework more up-to-date. By contrast, since 1998, Germany has seen a veritable flurry of 
wholly new laws and policy changes which may, to use Peter Hall’s well-known taxonomy, 
be described as ‘third order’:47 it has gained a dedicated Immigration Law, to include a 
simplified residence framework, family reunification and the possibility, however tentative, of 
high-skilled labour migration, as well as a rejuvenated and liberalised Citizenship Law and its 
first Anti-Discrimination Law. That said, the largely undifferentiated focus on restriction in 
labour migration, asylum and family reunification is unlikely to serve Germany’s broader 
demographic interests well. After all, high-skilled labour migrants may well have families 
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whom they wish to bring with them to Germany; likewise, the indications are that many 
asylum seekers to European countries are actually as well or better qualified than the 
indigenous population. 
 
Nonetheless, the extent to which Germany’s policy framework has evolved over the past 
fifteen years is nothing short of remarkable. This does raise an important question of why 
there should have been so much legislation after 1998 and three key reasons can be identified 
for this. First, and very obviously, the defeat of the CDU/CSU-FDP government at the 1998 
Bundestag election led to a new SPD-Green coalition at federal level with a progressive 
agenda in this area. While the Greens had long been at the liberal vanguard of the 
immigration debate, the SPD’s traditional hesitance in this area had been tempered by the 
1990s by the recognition that several aspects of immigration law required urgent attention and 
modernisation.48 In particular, the reform of citizenship in Germany became one of the 
coalition’s top legislative priorities, although this was soon followed up by the start of the 
long process which ultimately culminated in the 2005 Zuwanderungsgesetz.49  
 
The second reason is simply the passage of time. By the mid-1990s, the task of integrating the 
very large number of post-1945 war refugees was well and truly complete and with the GDR 
also defunct, the formal reason for maintaining the 1913 Citizenship Law no longer existed. 
What is more, the 1998 election marked a major generational caesura in German politics, with 
the retirement of the last politicians who had seen regular military service during the Second 
World War.50 The new Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, was the first incumbent not to have 
experienced the Second World War at first hand. When combined with the physical relocation 
of the capital from Bonn to Berlin in 1999, together with a concomitant change in the 
composition of the advisors who orbit the political world, this brought to the fore a new 
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generation of political class whose worldview had been shaped less acutely by the trauma of 
1945 and the subsequent division of Germany. This of course affected the CDU too, whose 
position on migration also began to change in opposition and especially under Angela 
Merkel’s leadership.51 Indeed, when the CDU returned to office in 2005, it did not seek to 
reverse the reforms undertaken by the SPD-Green government, but instead took them forward 
in the context of the Grand Coalition.52 
 
A third factor is the role of external institutions, including the Federal Constitutional Court 
and especially the EU. The importance of Courts in shaping policy is well established in the 
scholarly literature on migration, and Germany is no exception to this dynamic.53 Thus, the 
Federal Constitutional Court not only made it possible in 1978 for non-nationals to secure a 
permanent residence status, but also in 1990 struck down attempts to grant local voting rights 
to non-nationals and, in 1996, legitimised the 1993 restriction of asylum.  
 
In parallel, the EU has also become a major driving force for Germany’s policy framework in 
this domain ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam, which brought immigration into the EU’s 
First Pillar of policy-making, came into force in 1999. Despite its formulation being delayed 
in 2002 while Germany conducted an internal discussion about the age limits for 
Kindernachzug, the 2003 Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) opened the door for 
pre-entry integration requirements of the kind introduced in 2007.54 Germany’s acceptance of 
gender-based and non-persecution for asylum claims in the 2005 Immigration Law can be 
traced back to the Qualifications and Procedures Directive (2004/83/EC), while the 
introduction of anti-discrimination legislation had its origins in the Racial and Employment 
Equality Directives (2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC respectively).55 Similarly, the 2012 
Professional Qualifications Law and the Blue Card both implemented EU Directives 
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(2005/36/EC and 2009/50/EC respectively). Through a process of ‘downloading’ the 
provisions agreed at intergovernmental level and ‘uploading’ its own preferred options, the 
EU has thereby also helped converge Germany’s policy framework with that of other 
countries.56 
 
Overall, the last fifteen years have seen a remarkable process of legislative ‘catch-up’ in 
immigration, asylum and citizenship policy, to the extent that Germany’s policy portfolio now 
broadly mirrors that employed by other European countries in a comparable situation. It also 
indicates how Germany is now beginning to attempt to shape immigration and integration, 
rather than simply deny it. However, there are some key exceptions. First, the very low levels 
of highly-skilled migration suggest that Germany has a long way to go to become globally 
attractive as a destination for the ‘brightest and the best’. Second, Germany remains out of 
step on the issue of dual citizenship, which it continues to reject, in contrast to Belgium, 
Sweden and Switzerland, all of whom have opted to tolerate multiple nationalities since the 
turn of the Millennium.57 A final point to note here is the fact having legislation in place does 
not ipso facto guarantee that it is implemented in a generous and positive way. This has been 
a perennial problem in Germany stretching back to the 1970s and 1980s, and is one of the key 
reasons why the uptake of naturalisation and the Green Card have been so low.58 
 
Institutional and Societal Adaptation to Migration 
 
The preceding two sections of this article have captured the level of change which Germany 
has experienced in this domain in recent years. They paint a picture of increasingly diverse 
patterns of migration as well as of a more complete, if not always effective, policy 
framework. But in order fully to understand the extent and nature of change, the question of 
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the relationship between immigration and immigrants and their new home society must be 
considered to be equally important, albeit rather more nebulous. In order to gain a handle on 
this question, this final section therefore centres on three particular dimensions: definitional, 
institutional, and societal.  
 
In definitional terms, there has been something of a tectonic shift since the early 1990s.59 
First, the term used for immigration has changed: whereas in the 1990s, it was common to use 
Einwanderung (viz. Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland), since 1998 the term 
Zuwanderung has become widely accepted across the political spectrum, with the formal 
difference being that Einwanderung is formally recruited immigration, whereas Zuwanderung 
refers to any form of immigration. While this might seem to be a rather sophistic distinction, 
the use of the new term has certainly helped to detoxify what had become a highly polarised 
political debate. 
 
But of much greater significance has been the change in discourse away from the traditional 
practice of equating migration with nationality. By 2000, this definition had become 
increasingly outdated, due both to the growth in numbers of naturalisations (albeit from a very 
low base) after 1990 and to the large-scale migration of ethnic Germans over the same period, 
who (as Germans) were not captured in such statistics. In response, the Statistisches 
Bundesamt developed a new categorisation entitled ‘persons with migration background’ 
(Personen mit Migrationshintergrund), which is defined as having either a personal 
experience of migration, or one parent or one grandparent who has migrated to Germany. In 
its 2005 evaluation of the annual Mikrozensus of 1 per cent of households, this was applied 
for the first time, with the surprising result that around 1 person in 5, or almost 16 million 
persons, was found to have a Migrationshintergrund. Furthermore, subsequent data 
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evaluations in 2010 have revealed that there are more German citizens with a 
Migrationshintergrund than there are non-nationals in total, that a quarter of the entire 
population of the southern state of Baden-Württemberg falls into this category and that almost 
one-third of all children in Germany live in a family with a history of migration.60  
 
The impact of what is ultimately a technical change in data calculation has been profound. 
Within this new term, the length and complexity of Germany’s migration history is now 
reflected more fully and is moreover embedded widely in the population as a whole, not just 
among those without a German passport. What is more, the challenges in socio-economic 
integration which exist for non-nationals (notably, higher unemployment, lower educational 
qualifications and lower incomes) have been shown to be replicated amongst the wider 
population with Migrationshintergrund.61 This recognition has had major political 
ramifications, as it has rendered the traditional binary division in immigration policy between 
‘Germans’ and ‘Foreigners’ obsolete. All the main parties, therefore, have had to recognise 
the need to promote integration regardless of nationality, which is itself a progressive notion 
in the German context.  
 
In turn, this has led to significant improvements in the second dimension, namely the 
institutional governance of integration. In the past, this had been limited in scope and uneven 
in its geographic coverage. Although the office of the Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs 
(Ausländerbeauftragte) has existed at federal level since 1979, with intermittent equivalent 
positions at Land and municipal level, its function remained consultative until 2002, when its 
incumbent, Marieluise Beck, became a junior minister in the Family Ministry. But it was 
under Angela Merkel and the Grand Coalition in 2005 that the office attained a more central 
role, by being moved to the Federal Chancellery and focused more explicitly around 
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integration. This upgrading came in the wake of the appointment of Germany’s first 
integration minister at Land level, in Northrhine-Westphalia, earlier that year. The fact both 
these institutional innovations occurred in CDU-led governments gives an indication of how 
much this party has evolved.  
 
Since then, most Länder have incorporated integration among their ministerial portfolios, and 
since 2007, there has been a Standing Conference of Länder Integration Ministers 
(Integrationsministerkonferenz). In addition, the majority of Länder have Commissioners for 
Foreigners, who also network at federal level. In the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge), Germany has a new ‘parapublic’ 
agency to provide independent data on migration and integration.62 A further federal agency 
monitors discrimination (the Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes), although it does not 
have the power to bring prosecutions in the way the UK’s Equality Commission does. 
Nonetheless, by 2010, Germany had established a reasonably comprehensive network of 
institutions in this field.63  
 
Even so, Germany as a nation remains ambivalent about migration as an integral part of its 
society. On the one hand, the diversity of Germany’s national football team at the 2010 World 
Cup in South Africa captured the public’s imagination.64 Public opinion is stable on 
immigration and, if anything, somewhat more liberal on economic migration than in countries 
such as the UK.65 Extreme right-wing parties, although present at local and regional level, 
especially in the new Länder, have so far remained at the fringes of the political and party 
systems, in clear contrast to the much more central position they occupy in countries such as 
the Netherlands and France.  
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And yet, Germany has not found it easy to accept its growing ethnic and cultural diversity.66 
Historically, its conceptualisation of integration has focused much more on an active choice 
by non-nationals to embrace German culture than elsewhere, a perspective which underpinned 
the debates both about dual citizenship in 1999 and Germany’s ‘guiding culture’ (Leitkultur) 
in 2000.67 A central element of this has been an impassioned debate over how much diversity 
German society should tolerate in the name of integration: several highly publicised 
contributions have argued strongly that Germany should demand more of its migrant 
population, while in 2010 Chancellor Merkel herself declared multiculturalism to have ‘failed 
utterly’.68 But increasingly, this debate has crystallised around perceptions of the ability or 
inability of Christianity and Islam to coexist in Germany. The paradigmatic example of this 
was Thilo Sarrazin’s notorious critique of immigration to Germany, published in 2010, which 
generated the most polarised and intense public debate on any immigration-related question 
for a generation.69 In his book, Sarrazin presented a genetic and racially-based explanation to 
account for what he saw as the inability of Muslims to integrate into German society.70  
 
Since then, the debate has rumbled on: the then Federal President, Christian Wulff, used his 
speech marking the twentieth anniversary of unification in 2010 to respond to Sarrazin by 
declaring that Islam was a part of Germany alongside Christianity and Judaism, while the 
newly appointed Federal Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, chose the annual meeting of 
the Deutsche Islam Konferenz in 2012 to assert exactly the opposite. In parallel, issues such as 
honour killings, forced marriages, the wearing of headscarves by Muslim female teachers, but 
also terrorist incidents (such as the failed suitcase attacks on the rail network in 2006) have all 
shaped the perception of integration in Germany.71  
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Meanwhile, the relationship between law-enforcement agencies and the migrant population 
has also not always been harmonious. In late 2011, it emerged that a neo-Nazi terrorist cell 
operated in Germany under the noses of police and intelligence services for over ten years. 
During this time, they conducted a concerted murder campaign against people with immigrant 
background, which claimed no fewer than ten victims. On an everyday level, the police 
routinely used racial profiling in performing identity checks until prevented from doing so by 
the Courts in late 2012.72 Both examples suggest that ‘institutional racism’, as identified in the 
UK in the 1999 Macpherson report into the killing of Stephen Lawrence, is prevalent in 
Germany too.  
 
Politically too, the position of migrants remains in flux. Despite their very long periods of 
residence, and despite the liberalisations in citizenship law after 1990 with the ensuing 
increase in naturalisations, over 6 million persons remain non-nationals and thereby formally 
excluded from the democratic process in Germany. Even when migrants have German 
citizenship, their voting patterns are highly polarised, with ethnic Germans and naturalised 
Turks voting overwhelmingly for the CDU/CSU and SPD-Greens respectively.73 Despite 
some recent improvements, particularly at Land level, the presence of migrants among elected 
politicians nationally remains low.74  
 
Even so, there can be little doubt that the acceptance of migrants and the structures and 
outcomes of integration have improved over the past decade. Admittedly, this has not always 
been a process which Germany as a nation has embraced, as the intense political battles over 
immigration and citizenship during the 1980s and 1990s, but also public debates over 
Leitkultur and Sarrazin’s hypotheses testify. Moreover, the fact that a number of policy 
innovations and amendments in Germany have occurred as a result of developments at EU 
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level or because of the intervention of the Courts also indicate a certain degree of reluctance 
to address the challenges of migration proactively. What this means is that Germany 
continues to wrestle with many aspects of its migration legacy. However, it would be difficult 
to find any developed country for which this would not be the case – apart from the fact that 
few countries enthusiastically embrace their new-found diversity as a result of immigration, 
this process inherently and constantly creates new challenges and new opportunities for 
countries to respond to.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This purpose of this article has been to take stock of recent trends in migration to Germany, in 
order to gauge the country’s position as a country of immigration as it enters a phase where 
demographic change will make more recruitment of migration inevitable. It has found that, 
migration flows to Germany have become more heterogeneous in their origin and volume. In 
addition, they often reflect the prevailing state of the economy and they remain significant in 
absolute terms, irrespective of their net level. The article has also shown that the migration 
policy framework has evolved considerably, from what was a patchy framework in the 1980s 
(with moreover a palpable ethnic bias) to a quite comprehensive arsenal of legislation in 
2010. Lastly, the third section has shown how Germany has adapted, both terminologically 
and institutionally, to its new migration reality.  
 
Inevitably, the breadth of issues this article has addressed means that the direction of the 
developments is by no means coherent. Emigration, particularly by high-skilled Germans (and 
non-Germans!) has now become a major factor and so far, Germany’s attempts to attract 
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labour migrants have borne little fruit. Many of the legislative innovations passed in recent 
years, such as the anti-discrimination legislation, need more time to prove themselves; 
meanwhile, access to citizenship remains harder in Germany than elsewhere. The conditions 
for and process of integration, and especially the role of Islam, continues to be strongly 
contested in German society. 
 
But the benefit of taking such a grandstand view of immigration to Germany has been to 
reveal the cumulative impact of a range of otherwise relatively discrete changes to individual 
areas. In particular, this has shown how the dominant policy theme, for both main parties, has 
changed from prevention (from the Anwerbestopp in 1973 to the change of government in 
1998) to integration and, very gradually, back towards recruitment. In this process, two 
critical junctures stand out. First, the decision in 1998 by the new SPD-Green government to 
reform of the 1913 Citizenship Law, as the most egregious example of policy stasis, created 
several knock-on effects: it is inconceivable that the subsequent expansion of the policy 
framework to include the 2005 Immigration Law but also the 2006 anti-discrimination 
legislation could have proceeded without this. In other words, the 2000 Citizenship Law was 
the prerequisite for both main parties moving on from the immigration dogma of the Bonn 
Republic.  
 
Second, the technocratic decision to focus official statistics towards migration history after 
2005 has helped to re-define the way migration is viewed in Germany. By effectively 
decoupling migration from nationality, this change has injected a degree of maturity into 
political, if not always popular, debates which hitherto was rare in Germany. It also helped 
ensure that the step-change in the policy agenda initiated by the SPD-Green government was 
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not reversed by the CDU/CSU-led government; on the contrary, this was continued and 
expanded.  
 
In short, Germany has matured as an immigration country. Even so, it faces a considerable 
challenge if it is to withstand the deleterious impact of the far-reaching demographic change it 
will experience within the next decade. Most of all, and like most other European countries, 
Germany has failed to view migration as a joined-up policy area: immigration, residence, 
integration and naturalisation are at best only loosely linked to each other. And yet potential 
high-skilled labour migrants will look carefully at the provisions for their dependants, the 
prospects for their settlement and the degree to which Germany as a nation is welcoming to 
them. In light of Germany’s impending need for such skilled workers in much greater 
quantities than was the case previously, this will be the next major cognitive shift to be 
tackled.  
  
27 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Non-national population of Germany, 1968-2010 
 
Note: Excludes ethnic Germans. Figures pre-1991 are for West Germany only. From 2004, a different statistical 
base was employed; as a result numbers after this year are not comparable with previous years  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; Ausländerzentralregister. 
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Figure 2: Migration Flows to Germany, 1991-2010 
 
Note: Figures are for migration flows of Germans and non-Germans 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, cited in Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Migrationsbericht 2010 
(Nürnberg: BAMF, 2012), pp. 206-7 
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Figure 3: Net Migration to Germany by German, Turkish and Polish citizens, 1991-2010 
 
 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, cited in Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Migrationsbericht 
2010 (Nürnberg: BAMF, 2012), pp. 218-20 
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